But suppose the state decides to run this auction from the center. Certainly A should be allowed to bid in order to recover the right to sue on his own behalf. It is likely, moreover, that A will be an impressive entry into the bidding wars. Prosecuting any lawsuit for the violation of A's rights will require the cooperation of A. If liability turns on whether X struck A in self-defense, then A's testimony will be critical to overcoming this defense. In general, A's cooperation is needed for all aspects the case, but once he gains nothing from suit, he has no incentive to cooperate with the winning bidder. Other individuals will therefore discount their bids by the attendant costs of securing cooperation. A does not labor under this disability and therefore should have an inside track for the winning bid, at least if he has the resources in question. But of course he might not. The law suit could have drained him of cash resources, and even our sophisticated capital markets do regard a potential cause of action to serve as 100 percent collateral for a loan. (No risk-neutral bank could lend even $10 on an asset worth $1,000 if that value consists of a 50 percent chance of $2,000 and a 50 percent chance of $0.
The high variance in payoffs leaves the bank with a huge downside and no participation in the upside.)
The auction rule does not seem to be all that attractive in the abstract. This situation does not involve individuals who auction their own property, keeping the proceeds for themselves. Rather it is a state device for deciding who gets the right to own the cause of action in the first place. Many individuals, most notably Ronald Dworkin
LF-Class Actions
January 10, 2003 10 have suggested that all property in the state of nature be auctioned off by the state to the highest bidder. 6 But that suggestion to loses its operational appeal once we realize how difficult it would be to organize its operation before all potential bidders died of starvation. We (by which I mean all early societies without exception) therefore adopt a rule of first possession for the acquisition of land and chattels from the state of nature. 7 Reluctantly, we reach a similar conclusion here. A rule that assigns the cause of action to the victim of the wrong is less expensive to operate than any auction that we might set up; it enjoys legitimacy with a populus that quickly tires of strange mind games played by fevered law professors; it usually ends up giving the right of action to an individual who is in a good position to prosecute the suit himself; and, most critically, it allows that person to enter into side contracts with other individuals (call them lawyers)
for the prosecution of that suit, if it turns out that they do not have the skills to do it themselves. Indeed, in principle it could allow the individuals to sell the claims to other persons, even by auction, if that seems appropriate, as it often is in cases that involve the collection of receivables. But most often the contingent fee arrangement is the vehicle of choice because it gives access to adjudication to aggrieved persons with both limited wealth and limited ability to monitor the conduct of their lawyers. The bottom line here is that the initial allocation of the right of action to the person who suffers from its breach looks on examination to comport not only with the shadowy dictates of natural justice, but also to have real efficiency justifications that no global auction can duplicate. It gives a quick, clear and determinate owner to the right of action in question, regardless of its substantive content, and that person can make voluntary dispositions of the cause of 6 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 65-71 (2000) . action, including contingent fee or other sharing arrangements, in the event that he is not the ideal claimant. Auctions are possible, after a fashion. But they are run not by the state, but by the owner of the cause of action, where they need not be for sale but for the ubiquitous contingent fee arrangement.
Once we have reached this simple empirical conclusion, then we can ask the painful but necessary question. Is it good in each and every case? As often happens in exercises of this sort, our mental map of the transactions in question takes a particular form that is nowhere required by the statement of the problem itself. In this case, out usual view that a cause of action flows from the violation of the substantive right takes on following salient features. First, there is one and only one person who is victim of the violation of the right. It is defendant who has taken plaintiff's plow; no other plow has been taken. The value of the thing is large not only in absolute terms but also relative to the costs A has to incur to recover that plow from B. The legal system moreover will yield reliable results, such that A can prosecute his suit for a small cost, with some confidence that he will win on a meritorious claim.
Once we make these implicit assumptions explicit, then we can identify why the system of private rights is workable. By adopting an inflexible rule that each owner of property retains the right of action for its theft or destruction, we have eliminated a major stumbling block in organizing the legal system. A of course must still prove that the plow was his, for the defendant will win if he can show that he lent the plow to the plaintiff, with the understanding that it would be returned on demand. But no system of procedure can eliminate that factual dispute. Our rule only gets rid of the distraction that arises when some third party is endowed with this cause of action. That said, the plaintiff here will act normally as a self-interested person, which means that he will bring suit only if he estimates at the outset that his expected gain from the suit will exceed his expected costs. Both the cost of the legal system and the reliability of its processes enter into the plaintiff's crude calculations. Thus if the plow is worth $1,000 and the cost of suit equals
January 10, 2003 12 $100, then, if recovery is certain, A will sue, for a net $900 leaves him better off given that the plow was taken, even if he is worse off than if the plow had never been taken.
But this calculation ignores the risk of loss. If plaintiff thinks that he has only a 75 percent chance of winning the case, how his expected gain drops to $650, equal to the $750 he expects to recover (i.e. 0.75 x $1,000 -$100). But let the costs go up to $500, and the chances of success drop to 40 percent, and all of a sudden, the suit does not look attractive no matter how sound the underlying cause of action: a $400 recovery is less than $500 cost.
We are now in a position to understand the origin and appeal of the class action some, but not all cases. Quite simply the unthinkable becomes thinkable when the basic scenario changes. All that we need do in order to make this happen is to alter three parameters. The first of these is that the number of individuals similarly situated with respect to a common defendant is very large. The second is that the loss sustained by each part is relatively small. The third is that the administrative costs of individual suit turn out to be quite high. In these circumstances we can now see the consequences of a rule that allows each aggrieved individual to bring his own suit. Quite simply, he will not accept this invitation if the costs of litigation exceed the level of recovery, which could easily happen with the high price of lawyers. Within the framework of voluntary transactions, we might expect A to sell his claim, but any individual buyer will face all the problems that beset A and still have to enlist A's support in order to make his claim good.
The obvious escape hatch to this impasse in a voluntary world is for all the individuals to pool their claims together (under the rules of permissive joinder, as authorized under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules) in order to take advantage of what they hope will prove to be economies of scale. These rules limit the use of permissive joinder to cases in which the parties pursue their rights "in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of LF-Class Actions January 10, 2003 13 transactions or occurrences." But this limitation on the use of permissive joinder hardly binds at all, for unless this condition is satisfied the individual plaintiffs have little reason to pursue cooperative activities. After all, the hope of parties in a permissive joinder situation is that the cost of suit will rise less rapidly than the value of the amalgamated claims, so that in union they will find strength. But typically they quickly learn that these negotiations are fraught with difficulty for someone has to put together the pool that divides expenses and recovery, and someone has to decide how much each claimant should contribute, both initially and thereafter. Since we are, by hypothesis, still in a world of free bargaining, nothing compels each person to accept a prorata share of expenses and gains upon joining into the pool in question. It is possible for individuals to holdout for a larger share of the gain on condition of joining the business. The process could take place quite subtlety as when one party insists on a minimum level of recovery out of the common pool, which leaves other people at greater risk and could induce them to make the same demands until 150 percent of the pie is fully accounted for. What makes this problem so difficult to deal with is that holdouts, wishing to avoid rebuke, often take concealed and not brazen approaches toward individual aggrandizement. They claim that their claim really is worth a great deal more than anyone else thinks and calibrate their demands to the perceived value of their interest. Bargaining breakdown is high in these circumstances, which is just what we should expect. We can think of the defendant, as seen through the eyes of members of the plaintiff class, as though he were a common pool asset (say oil and gas under the land of multiple landowners), and the defendants each as claimants to the some fraction of the pool. Often it happens that the surface owners cannot agree on any appropriate split of expenses and recovery, so each takes an independent course of action that leads to excessive costs of extraction whose necessary byproduct is the LF-Class Actions January 10, 2003 14 reduction of the total oil and gas taken from the pool. Permissive joinder in these cases can work in some circumstance. But often it does not. It is the failures that explain the rise of the class action.
Class Actions for Voluntary Associations. To see how the argument works, it is best examine it in an environment that is most hospitable to the class action, that is, those situations where all plaintiffs have interests that have been crafted the same under the substantive law. Suppose that the question at hand is disputed behavior in a corporation, partnership or some voluntary association. A common version of the complaint is that a key corporate officer has purchased a collective asset in a cozy transaction for a sum well below its market price. The remedy in this case is to unravel the transaction so that the asset is returned to the corporation and the cash to the individual buyer. (I ignore all complications with the time value of money, subsequent transactions and the like.) The question is who is in the best position to maintain the suit to undo this transaction. In principle the action belongs to the corporation; but notwithstanding its lofty legal status, a corporation has no independent powers of self-generation. Usually the directors act as "its" agents and in this case they have fallen asleep at the switch. So at least one shareholder has to step up to the plate for the corporation, AKA the other shareholders in question. So how this transaction is organized?
One possible way is to think of a permissive joinder suit among shareholders, but this fails for a number of critical reasons. First, the chronic coordination problems can arise with shareholders every bit as much as it can with surface owners. Second, the proposed relief is indivisible in that it benefits one shareholder as much (or as little) as the next.. As noted earlier the proper procedure is to unravel the transaction so that the thing is restored to the corporation, usually with its purchase price refunded to the outsider. That form of relief benefits all shareholders whether they participate in the litigation or not: it is not just the case as "a practical matter," as Rule 23 says; rather it is as a necessary matter deriving from the structure of the corporation itself. In this setting,
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we now have the worry that some shareholders will simply choose to free ride on the efforts of others. They will bear none of the costs of running the suit (and the consequent risk of failure). Yet they will stand to gain equally with all other shareholders once the corporation has recovered the asset in question. The danger therefore in this situation is not that of excessive and ungrounded suits by rapacious class action attorneys. Unless something is done to fix up the imbalance, the real risk is that serious wrongdoing at the corporate level will go unchecked for want of a champion to deal with the problem.
The standard response has been to craft the derivative action whose origin has been neatly summarized as follows:
In these circumstances, the shareholders' injury (diminution in the value of their shares) derives from the fact that the alleged misconduct has reduced the value of the corporation's assets. Further, this type of derivative injury is suffered in common by all shareholders according to their proportionate interest in the corporation. The shareholders' derivative suit was created by equity courts to permit a shareholder to vindicate wrongs done to the corporation as a whole that management, because of either self-interest or neglect, would not remedy. 8
So at this point we can now start to see how, at least in some core cases, the class action operates as a system of forced exchanges that works for the benefit of the individuals who are subject t o the state-generated coercion. At this point we are not talking about class actions across the board, but solely one special instance of them, the derivative suit, brought by shareholders in the name of the corporation, or its analogues for associations and partnerships. The basic logic is this: the knight who steps forward to maintain the suit is paid by the corporation out of the winnings of the action. This simple expedient at first look has all the right incentive features. In the first place, once "typical" of those of other class members. It is that these actions are all "identical," so that from a structural point of view we cannot conceive of a better class representative.
At this point the conclusion clearly follows: Once the action is successfully brought, then the payment issue can be solved by ordering the corporation (i.e. the shareholders) to make an appropriate payment to the outside champion. If the applicable rules so allow, the corporation in turn could be allowed some recovery of those fees from the wrongdoer under a version of the winner-takes-all method. But that wrinkle should depend more on the fee shifting rules generally, and not on the particulars of class actions. Each member of the class bears the same fractional interest in the payment as he obtains from the successful recovery, so that the rule in question divides up the gains from the transaction in accordance with their respective investments. No one is allowed to opt out of this particular class-see Rule 23(c)(2)-which is just as it should be, because the nature of the relief-restoration to the corporation-works to his benefit. But then, why would anyone want to back out when the alternative is to get nothing at all.
Invariance in Aggregation Thus far it looks as though the derivative suit is the world's perfect class action in that it forces all shareholders to deviate from their initial property holdings in ways that leave them better off than before. In practice this conclusion is of course too optimistic because the complete package requires use to develop rules for the selection and compensation of attorneys which is not so easily done.
I shall pass by these issues here, in order to pursue the central theme of this paper, which asks whether, and if so, how the aggregation of individual claims within the class action format leads to a distortion of the substantive law that works typically in favor of the plaintiffs, not only within the confines of these corporate and associational cases. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (1997) .
business. 11 These issues are hard enough to resolve in their own right, and the ideal set of procedural rules is not one that induces parties to go into or to avoid bankruptcy solely on the grounds of the relative procedural advantages of the various fora. Thus, it would be quite dangerous if the legal position allowed a plaintiff-creditor to defeat a statute of limitations defense available in state court by filing for bankruptcy. At this point they may well choose an inefficient place to litigate in order to gain a partisan advantage.
Defendants will have equal and opposite incentives, and the whole system could easily grind to a halt, for in both cases the private advantage creates a social disadvantage.
Likewise, in dealing with the regulation of private land use disputes between neighbors, it is important to keep parallelism between the ordinary tort actions that some neighbors can bring against another and the actions (often class actions) that the state can bring on behalf of some neighbors against others. Let the state be given substantive or procedural advantages not available to the individual plaintiffs, and enforcement will migrate into public hands even if the private law offers systematically superior substantive solutions on the issues. Likewise, if the private law is systematically more advantageous to plaintiffs, they now have an incentive to resist more efficient class actions solely to obtain partisan advantages. In all these cases, then, we should be careful to see that the amalgamation of claims does not alter the balance of power between the two sides except insofar as it overcomes the transactional obstacles that justify the use of the class action in the first place. It is for just this reason that zoning rules are so often problematic. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 12 the state sought to prevent any construction on a beachfront lot by regulation. No private neighbor could obtain an injunction to that effect, but would have to purchase a restrictive covenant. The switch from the private to the public forum should not result in a fundamental change in the substantive law. The claims may have some elements in common, but also some important differences. Often the salience of these differences and similarities may not be fully apparent at the outset of the suit, but only become apparent once discovery has been undertaken, or perhaps even at trial. The upshot is that the critical decision on class action certification often has to take place prior to any genuine assessment as to what the ultimate shape of the claims will be. In this regard, the identification of appropriate class members could easily shift over the life of the litigation.
To their credit, the current class rules appear to recognize the difference in similarly situated-itself a term of art-must become members of the class whether they want to or not. At least one strand of thought, championed most conspicuously by Professor David Rosenberg, claims that this mandatory approach is correct, and holds, in effect, that the conscription of individual plaintiffs into the class action really works to their benefit, such that they have no reason to opt out of the class to control their own suit. 15 The law can make that judgment for them at lower cost and higher reliability.
Indeed in one sense his position goes a step further. Since the real question is deterrence of defendants, he takes the view that there is no particular reason to want to distribute the money to any members of the victim class. Their protection comes in a different form:
stronger deterrence reduces the occasions on which compensation is required. At this point, the entire system becomes rickety because the contours of a "mass tort" are far from clear in the abstract. With the asbestos litigation, for example, different individuals were exposed under different working conditions to fibers produced by different manufacturers at different times. Some of these are exposure only cases; others involve physical harm, which might be caused by other agents. 16 In some cases it might prove hard to decide whether certain workers should be included in a class or not. That decision is momentous enough when the stakes are how the litigation should proceed.
But the boundary condition would become far more salient if class members received no compensation while individual tort claimants could get full compensation. At this point, the class action ceases to be a simple aggregation device. class to bring his own suit for money damages, all other individuals may proceed under the class rubric if they please. The key point here is to make sure that those who hang back to do not get the benefit of the offensive use of res judicata should the class action be successful, while reserving the right to bring their individual suits anew should that action fail.
Once individuals are allowed to opt out, they must be able to receive some notice, by publication or in person, about the terms and conditions under which the class action will proceed, as Rule 23 provides. In many cases where the individual sums for the class are small (as with the miscalculation of interest rates on small personal loans), most people will choose to stay put, assuming that they pay any attention to the matter at all.
But, nothing about the current structure of the rules of civil procedure limits ordinary class actions to small overcharge cases. Huge tort actions and substantial antitrust claims may also be brought in this form, and here the choice whether to opt out is far weightier because the damages are anything other than "paltry". In these cases, moreover, individual plaintiffs may well decide to commence their suit before any class action could begin, so that it is highly doubtful that a plaintiff should be bound to the class unless at the very least he receives actual notice of the suit, and probably not even then unless he agrees to a stay of his own litigation pending the outcome of the class action. After all, if two individuals brought suit, neither would be stopped in his tracks simply because he had notice of the other suit. Some evidence of collusive or opportunistic behavior would seemingly be required.
The issue of class membership has, moreover, important consequences for the defendant, although it is difficult in the abstract to say which way they cut. On the one hand, corralling all the plaintiffs in an individual class action reduces the litigation costs for the defendant, and avoids the possibility of follow-on suits (from which the plaintiffs can learn from earlier strategic mistakes even if they do not have the benefit of res judicata). On the other hand, the creation of a huge nationwide class makes it impossible LF-Class Actions That predominance requirement is generally satisfied in cases of antitrust violation where all sales within a given period were made as part of the same business scheme to the same set of plaintiffs. 22 The level of perceived overcharge (assuming that the members of the plaintiff class have standing to sue, which may be problematic in some cases of "indirect purchasers" 23 ) is roughly constant so that once the difference between the monopoly and the competitive price is determined for one party in one transaction, then it is largely determined for all. This argument presupposes that a single scheme controlled multiple separate transactions, such that the outer limits of the class could well be sensitive to changes in the defendant's pricing policies or its relationships with other firms in the industry. There remains the constant gnawing problem that distinct state law claims may well be governed by different laws that make their amalgamation harder to justify. 24 But in general these cases will be amenable to some level of class formation. Even if all potential plaintiffs do not fit snugly within the confines of a single class, it is easy to imagine a couple of subclasses that will cover the vast bulk of cases. of damages but of liability and defenses to liability would be present, affecting the individuals in different ways." Thus even if two individuals were hit by the same car at the same time, the issues in the two cases could overlap but not be precisely the same.
Here much could turn on the theory of liability. If liability were strict, so that the only question was whether this defendant hit both plaintiffs, then the issue could easily be common between the parties. But if liability is based on negligence, then the defendant might have been negligent with respect to the plaintiff in plain view but not with respect to one that was not within his line of vision. Or some jurisdictions could adopt a principle of "transferred negligence," such that the defendant who was aware that one plaintiff was in the field of danger, is liable in negligence to a second defe ndant who could have been spared injuries if the defendant had taken only those precautions needed to deal with the plaintiff in plain view.
The situation with mass torts, of course, only becomes more difficult when the defendant has engaged in a similar line of business over a long period of time, such as the selling of asbestos or a pharmaceutical product. In these cases we lose the Aristotelian unities of time and space, so that one might think that only rarely would the class action be appropriate in suits of this sort under the Federal Rules. But in this case a set of ambitious certifications in a wide variety of cases, moving from blood transfusions to cigarettes, indicates how the law has migrated from initial cautious attitudes in these cases to a far more aggressive stance. A similar migration can be found in cases involving misrepresentations, where the 1966 attitude toward misrepresentations, which was prepared to allow many actions where the separate cases had a "common core," but not in those ins tances where "although having some common core, a fraud case may be unsuited for treatment as a class action if there were material variation in the representations made or in the kinds of degrees of reliance by the persons to whom they were addressed." The current attitude seems to be that even if the common issues do not dominate the law suits, then the appropriate response is to use the class action for those See, e.g., Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227 , 1234 (9th Cir. 1996 : "Even if the common questions do not predominate over the individual questions so that class certification of the entire action is warranted, Rule 23 authorizes the district court in appropriate cases to isolate the common issues under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) and proceed with class treatment of these particular issues." Rule 24(c)(4)(A) in turn provides that "an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues. . . . ." If Rule 24(c)(4)(A) is read to allow class action status to be determined issue by issue, then it makes a dead letter of the overall predominance requirement for Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, which is why this provision has been read to provide a mere "housekeeping rule" that does not upset the requirements for a Rule Just this remorseless reading of the class action law was found in Judge Easterbrook's forceful opinion denying both nationwide and statewide class certification for beach of warranty claims for Firestone and Bridgestone tires which performed poorly and were subject to recall. The initial question in these cases concerned the choice of law issue. The plaintiffs in Bridgestone/Firestone argued that all these recall cases should be treated as contract not tort cases, so that they could all be adjudicated under the substantive law of each defendant's principal place of business. The traditional rule which ties contract claims to the place where the consumer resides, typically the place of sale, would obviously place a major obstacle in the path of a nationwide class action.
Judge Easterbrook found that the plaintiff's reinterpretation of Indiana choice of law rules was clear: Indiana would apply its own consumer protection laws to any transaction involving an in-state consumer who purchased goods within the state. From that point,
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For a discussion of the two-tiered approach, see Amchem Products 521 U.S. at 613-614. it is much riskier to follow the pattern of amalgamation, for once the cases are together then the individual differences in the plaintiff's cases will be bled out of the equation, so that all suits will appear to be cut from the same cloth. As the choice of forum will normally lie within the control of plaintiffs, it is likely that the substantive law will drift in their favor.
LF-Class Actions
As will quickly become evident, there are many jurisdictions that are less responsive to the fear that the aggregation of individual claims will lead not only to (unbaised) amplification, but also to distortion. Here the great danger is that courts in close (and not so close cases) will adopt that version of the substantive law that facilitates class action suits. Several examples are in order from securities law, antitrust, and employment discrimination. were not sellers of the shares; nor did they make any specific statements to identifiable purchasers. If each plaintiff had been forced to show his own reliance on some particular false statements, then it would be impossible to keep the class intact. But once the Supreme Court accepted a "fraud-on-the-market" theory, which presumes that efficient capital markets quickly embed all false information into the price, then the element of reliance flips over from a separate to a common issue, allowing the class to hold together.
I have no doubt that one reason why the Supreme Court embraced this substantive theory was to foster the use of class actions in securities case. Yet even here its conclusion can be criticized on the ground that the presumption of reliance is at most rebuttable, so that the defendant could try to show, on a case by case basis, that individual plaintiffs had disbelieved the information when published. But rebuttable evidence is admissible only in a small fraction of cases, so that even the shift in the burden of proof allows the class action to go forward. under stand ards that would not be used in individual cases. bargaining agreements but subject to Metro-North's Progressive Disciplinary System, which is administered at the field level by some 400 supervisors and managers, all of whom are capable of bringing charges against individual workers. There was one complaint voiced by Metro-North's Affirmative Action Director about the disproportionate number of disciplinary incidents involving people of color. Of the 27 named plaintiffs, nineteen alleged that they suffered unfair discipline because of race.
On the promotion side, the plaintiffs alleged that the declared policy of internal promotion require that all openings be posted, but gives to the manager of each unit the final power to fill the vacancy in question. In practice, postings were a mere formality in some cases and omitted in others. The individual black plaintiff alleged that he had been passed over in favor of four white applicants who were less qualified than he was. Using a regional standard of proportional representation, underutilization of African-Americans was found in five of eight categories.
The question was whether this information was sufficient to support a class action certification which the District Court refused to issue and which was overturned under an abuse of discretion standard. 39 That phrase, however, does not quite mean what it says, because the standard for abuse is a lot tougher when the District Court refuses certification than when it allows it. There is of course no obvious explanation based on the relative competence of District and Appellate Courts that supports this one-way ratchet, which turned out to be quite important in the instant case. Once the moving standard of review took place, the court the n noted that the class certification stage was not the moment to examine the case closely on its merits, and thus allowed the plaintiff's statistical case to carry the day.
For these purposes, however, the key point is the transformation of the substantive theory on which this case was brought. To see why, think of how these cases would be In some cases, individual plaintiffs seek to make out disparate impact by pointing to some firm-wide substantive policy that fostered some forbidden disparate impact. But in this case the only relevant general policy was a system-wide commitment toward affirmative action. In this context, the defendants might, with some justification, use its affirmative action program to help explain any differential rates in discipline or promotion that existed at Metro-North. After all an affirmative action program requires Metro-North to take some high risk moves ex ante, and these could help explain (perhaps in some units but not in others) the differential rates in promotion and discip line ex post.
A neutral standard should be expected to yield higher failure rates with the weaker applicant pool in both cases. It should be clear that these disparate impact cases have In the face of this standard mode of proof, any effort to forge a class action out of either discipline or promotion, let alone the two together, would (or, alas, at least should) be regarded as laughable. The aggregation does not make sense. But it is at this point that the substantive expansion of disparate impact theory is said to fill the gap under a very generous class standard which finds that the "commonality" requirement for class actions "is met if plaintiffs' grievances share a common element of law or of fact" 42 -where the words "a" and "or" deserve to be put into italics, if not neon lights. The new wrong of the defendant was not its firm wide rules of equal opportunity or affirmative action. Rather it takes the novel form of "overdelegation", to wit a "policy --the delegation to supervisors, pursuant to company-wide policies, of discretionary authority without sufficient oversight --that gives rise to common questions of fact warranting certification of the proposed class. . v. Guiliani, 126 F.3d 372, 376 (2d Cir. 1997 ).
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business policy-the decentralization of various kinds of employment decisions-and treats that as though it were a fatal wrong. In so doing this threadbare theory overlooks any questions of causation: the want of supervision would only matter if the individual units all deviated from the assigned standards in more or less the same way. But in each case, a trier of fact would necessarily have to find the work done at the unit level fell below the appropriate standards at the center for this alleged breach of duty to matter at all. Clearly that question of unit compliance raises issues that are not common to class even if this new substantive duty is accepted. In the end therefore is ample reason to see why Caridad was an appropriate precedent for Visa Check. The need to preserve a class action at all costs drives a court to distort the underlying theory substantive liability beyond recognition. We have more than aggregation at work. We have a wholesale distortion of the substantive standards, the chief effect of which is to facilitate a finding of discrimination in cases where it is highly unlikely to appear.
The full extent to which the procedural processes of the class action t urn substantive law inside out is further evidenced by the subsequent history of Caridad on remand. Once the case was remanded to the District Court, Judge Rakoff again refused to certify the class and dismissed the class action, noting the lack of common issues on liability. 44 What makes this case so striking was that after the remand in Caridad the In this case, however, the denial of any opt-out (at least until the damage phase)
would individual plaintiffs the control over a suit in which they have very large stakes.
In addition, it hands the class lawyers a very large club with which to obtain a settlement-and to avoid competition by other lawyers who seek business from class members after opt-outs are allowed. The initial question is whether this trade makes sense in light of the interests of the class members and the defendants. This subdivision is intended to reach situations where a party has taken action or refused to take action with respect to a class, and final relief of an injunctive nature or of a corresponding declaratory nature, settling the legality of the behavior with respect to the class as a whole, is appropriate. ... The subdivision does not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages.
LF-Class Actions
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Yet there is absolutely no way to decide how to work this balance unless one has some idea about the nature of the injunctive relief that is sought. But of course, no hint of that is offered in Robinson It seems almost inconceivable that injunctive relief would even be on the table in any individual grievance where little if anything would turn on the overdelegation theory. It would of course be grotesque to allow any individual employee to obtain injunctive relief outside the class action framework. The entire point of a damage remedy is to create an incentive to avoid violation of the law, and it seems doubtful that anyone could frame an injunction that looks both sensible and enforceable.
In addition, any supposed injunctive relief could not benefit equally all members of a class that covers employees from 1985 to 1996, many of whom had been promoted or not disciplined, and many of whom had doubtless left Metro-North's employ never to return. Even in a class context, it is hard to think of any injunctive relief that makes sense in light of the comprehensive regime of affirmative action that is already in place, and which may have been fine-tuned since 1996, the last year covered by the class.
In principle, class aggregation should not upset the balance between these two forms of relief, but once again the key distortion sets in not because injunctions make sense for these disputes but solely because of the greater leverage that the Rule 23(b) (2) class action affords. These effects continue to work their way through the entire case.
Thus Judge Walker noted that i f the entire case could not be certified as a (b)(2) class, then the liability phase surely could be-but not if the anecdotal evidence could freely be introduced. So once again we alter the rules in question. If the entire case cannot be tried as a (b)(2) class, then the liability phase . "Indeed, to ensure that the liability phase remains manageable, the district court may limit the anecdotal evidence as it deems where the simplification in liability rules cuts to their advantage. Then they are allowed back in the second stage of the case when the damage issues are on the table. It seems quite clear that the plaintiffs sho uld not be allowed to raise due process objections against rules that are heavily rigged in their favor. But this ostensible cure for one set of due process concerns should sound the alarm that a second set has taken place: the defendants cannot respond in full to the charges raised against them because of their inability to raise their defenses to liability. The fiction that the injunctive relief is common, when the position of class members is not, warps the liability phase of the trial beyond all recognition. The upshot is that the new legal regime created by the class action rules gives the plaintiff lawyers all the tools it needs to bludgeon the defendants into submission on a disparate impact claim that is far, far weaker than anything contemplated under the original Griggs decision. The procedural tail has wagged the substantive dog.
The aggregation of claims has resulted in a powerful distortion of the substantive law in ways that systematically favor plaintiffs over defendants in contradiction t o the basic model that should govern these cases.
Conclusion.
Face it, the class action is here to stay. And so it should, for there no question that in some contexts it allows plaintiffs with sound but small substantive claims to gain access to the c ourthouse that would be denied to them without some method of amalgamation. The class action offers the key for taking the disorganized business of life and structuring it in simplified ways that permit mass adjudication. How could anyone such as myself, who authored a book entitled "Simple Rules for a Complex World", be opposed to that development? Yet there is more than one way in which the issue on simplification goes to the heart of the current disputes over the propriety of class actions.
A generatio n ago no one would have doubted that any individual tort case, antitrust tie-in case or employment case was a complex matter under the applicable substantive law.
Often the rules used in those cases were at sharp variance to those that I would apply to
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January 10, 2003 44 those same situation. In my view, the multiple factor tests used in product liability cases are far inferior to a simple common law rule that asks whether a latent defect of the defendant's product caused harm to the plaintiff while in its original conditio n. 50 If this substantive view had prevailed, we would not have to worry about class action in tobacco cases, because the generic risks of tobacco are so well-known that they would be routinely barred, as they indeed were under the natural reading of comment i to Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts. 51 Likewise, I think that for the most part the antitrust laws should concern itself in dealing with horizontal price-fixing arrangements and mergers, so that exotic tie-in theories with treble damage actions no less become would be come thing of the past . Finally, I would do away with the disparate impact theory of liability in employment discrimination cases in their entirety.
In dealing with the soundness of class actions, however, it will not do to complain about the substantive law as it has been developed in Congress, state legislatures and the courts introduces unneeded complexity in pursuit of unwise legal ends. As the rest of this article has presupposed, throughout the class action debate, across the board we have to treat procedural law as adjectival law that presupposes the soundness of the underlying substantive law. At this point, it is only because the class action system does not seem to work as planned in this (as in other ways) that we should fear or condemn its continued application. It is sometimes argued (as by Samuel Issacharoff at the class action 50
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Modern Products Liability Law (1980).
51
"Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful; but tobacco contained something like marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous." Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402A, comment i. Note that the phrase "unreasonably dangerous" is the predicate for strict liability under Section 402A itself.
Conference where this talk was originally presented) 52 , it has been argued that the class action is really the friend of the conservative/libertarian intellectual in that effective enforcement of class actions reduces the need for direct government regulation that conservatives and libertarians view with such suspicion. But that criticism misfires in this context for several reasons. First, it forces us to interject our views of substantive law into the separate question of whether, and if so how, the class action is an effective means of enforcement for existing legal rights, whatever these may be. But even if we put that caveat aside, the class action does not neatly line itself up with the dispute between regulation and private ordering. The class action is a boon to private contract when it permits large numbers of individuals to gain refunds of small refunds to which they are entitled under contract. It is also a boon when it allows property holders to recover damages for the wrongful conversion of their property. 53 But let the overcharge be a creature of regulation, then the class action switches side, just as it does when it is used to enforce zoning ordinances against property owners.
Indeed, even if we confine our attention to situations of direct government intervention, it hardly follows that ordinary private litigation is preferable to direct government regulation. In the product liability area, for example, I have long taken the view that the state should prescribe in advance the standard warnings that it wishes to impose on certain generic products, and to allow private damage actions only in the unlikely event that manufacturers deviate from those warnings. That one simple rule would eliminate huge amounts of litigation over the adequacy of warnings, whether on cigarettes or prescription drugs. The lawyers, both for plaintiffs and defendants only To be sure, the denial of class action means that relief does not go necessarily to the parties who are injured. And in some cases the deterrence supplied by other methods
54
See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Calabreser, Access, Equity and Finality of Adjudication: The Role of Class Actions in our Civil Justice System, Testimony before the Subcommittee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives: Oversight Hearing on Mass Torts and Class Action Lawsuits, March 5, 1998. "My clients have been men and women from all walks of life and al parts of the country who needed to take action to protect their rights, their jobs, their property, their savings or their local environment; or who simply sought fair compensation, in their lifetimes, for injuries or losses from defective or dangerous products." Id at 3. The rhetorical power of her statement should be evident. But so too its shortcomings. Her clients will take what she can provide, and will not be upset with overcompensation for admitted wrongs or errors in the system that provides them with relief when none should be forthcoming.
LF-Class Actions
January 10, 2003 48 might prove to be less (or more) than ideal. But the class action is also subject to defects in its administration that dog its application at every step. Ultimately, the only question worth asking here is what mix of these various remedial techniques leads to the fewest imperfections. That question cannot be answered authoritatively across the board one way or the other. But the real and persistent danger of distortion through aggregation counts as one strong mark against the class action in its current configuration, one which it lies within the capabilities of the courts to correct.
We are now in a position to isolate one reason why class actions can go off the rails. In principle, the class action should serve through aggregation as an amplifier for the ordinary principles of civil litigation. Where those substantive principles are correctly announced, then the class action increases their effectiveness. Yet when these are incorrectly stated, then the class action magnifies the mischief that these new actions can bring. For someone like myself who think that there is much which is wrong with the underlying substantive law, the class action generates real ambivalence. I have no objection to its use to enforce the fundamental prohibitions against force and fraud, but great reservation about its use in discrimination cases such as Caridad and Robinson, where I have grave doubts about the coherence of the substantive law. But for these purposes, those objections are not the relevant concern. Rather my objection here presupposes the soundness of the substantive la w in individual cases and then notes that the process of class aggregation can result in a systematic effort to simplify the substantive law in ways that reduce the requirements for proof on the plaintiff side while increasing the potency of the remedies awarded. The constant pressure on both these fronts cannot continue without provoking dramatic consequences that spill over from the abstruse world of class action litigation into the world of practical affairs. There is no way in which we should seek to bar the use of class actions whose effects are benevolent
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in some cases and harmful in others that we cannot make a uniform assessment of the overall effects of class action practices. All that can be confidently said normatively is that the more the class action conforms to the older models used in derivative suits for corporations and voluntary associations, the sounder they will be. Yet, we should be confident that most of the recent innovations in class actions have tended to deviate from those ideals. In all too many cases the process of claim aggregation is the claim distortion. The original vision of class action was designed to avoid these dangers. But all too often they have been, systematically it appears, been overlooked.
